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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between credit risk and credit 
cycle on the one hand and economic cycle on the othr hand in Croatian banking and 
economy. Potential threats to correct credit risk management in banks and to stability of the 
financial system, which result from the influence of different factors, will be identified as well. 
At the theoretical level there is no agreement on these questions. However, the dependence of 
the economic cycle towards the credit cycle and risk has been clearly proved in numerous 
empirical studies. Such researches have not been done in Croatia. The results of our 
regression analysis have shown, among other things, that credits to enterprises have a 
greater influence on GDP than credits to households. Statistically, we have identified two 
credit booms and between them one credit bust. During the first credit bust, which was a 
result of a bank crisis, the rates of economic growth decreased drastically. Bank crisis was 
the consequence of poor credit risk management and supervisor's neglect. Everything shows 
that a new credit bust and a financial crisis could follow. Existing GDP growth rates, mostly 
based on the growth of consumption stimulated by credits, cannot be sustained. The limitation 
of deficit and the slowing down of economic activity might make the banks even more 









At the level of theoretical approach there is no agreement in regard to a possible 
connection between credit risk and credit cycle on the one hand and economic cycle 
on the other hand. According to the traditional theory of perfect market and rational 
selection, which is enriched with new findings of the rational anticipation school, 
money as well as various financing forms is neutral. Crises are explained as a 
consequence of accidental external shocks such as wars, natural disasters etc. Another 
approach has also been present for a longer period of time. That approach emphasizes 
greater or lesser financial instability which is considered inseparable from real 
economy. Recent numerous theoretical and especially empiric researches have 
brought to light certain situations in which credit agitates real economy. The credit 
influence on real economy is explained by different reasons including difficulties in 
credit and other risks management. To what extent those reasons are relevant in 
explaining the credit influence on the real flows in Croatian economy - is the question 
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that will be answered in this paper. Before that, it is important to note some basic 
notions on these different approaches. 
 
2. Theoretical Controversies and Experience 
 
The traditional thesis on the neutrality of financial structure is best presented in the 
Modigliani - Miller theory (1958, p.261-297). According to these authors' 
propositions, enterprises are indifferent to financing from their own sources, financing 
through borrowing from banks or through issue of securities. They support their point 
of view by several assumptions. In the first place, n ither research costs nor 
transaction costs that result from making contracts re generated by access to external 
financing. Secondly, there is no problem in enterprise control. Thirdly, there is no 
discriminative tax that would prefer one particular source of financing enterprises to 
others. Finally, economic entities share identical and perfect situation. Consequently, 
the way conditions that prevail in financial markets are seen leads to the conclusion 
that the selection of financing forms should not have ny influence on real economy. 
 
However, most assumptions of perfect market as wellas the assumption of perfect 
substitutability of internal and external financing sources have become questionable. 
Thus, one peculiar theoretical analysis gives a very convincing proof that there is no 
agreement between desires for debt and desires for borrowing and lending (Gurley 
and Shaw, 1960). These authors have also subtly expained the connections existing 
between financial and real flows. Among other things their "Primary Issues - Income 
Ratio" (p. 97) represents the reciprocal value of Keynesian investment multiplier. 
They emphasize an essential role of financial intermediaries in the transformation of 
characteristics of financial assets towards maturity, sk and profitability. In their 
earlier papers there is the assumption of financial instability in which the behaviour of 
banks plays an essential role (Minsky, 1964, p.173-380). According to this 
interpretation there is an interdependence of financial (financing through market and 
bank credits) and economic fluctuations. Accordingly, these connections are 
components of endogenous cycle of boom and bust. The renewed theory of financial 
intermediation, which has given various evidences for banks' advantages in relation to 
other financing sources of enterprises, includes a study of relation between credit and 
economic cycle. The essential condition for credit channel functioning is found in the 
fact that there always are enterprises dependent on banks. This condition is fulfilled in 
countries where the financing of enterprises through financial markets is the biggest. 
In the USA for example, between 1970 and 1996, external financing sources of the 
non-financial corporations were realized through bank credit with about 40%, through 
credits from other financial institutions with about 15%, through bonds with about 
36% and through issues of shares with only 9% (Smidt, 2001; According to Mishkin 
and Eakins, 2005, p.372). Among various new interpretations of the relation between 
credit and economic cycle, which emphasize the credit isk management, two of them 
are often quoted. The first one refers to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
p.393-410) and the second one to disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1986; 
Herring, 1999, p.63-79). The credit rationing is explained as a consequence of 
asymmetric information ex ante in the imperfect market. Banks do not have at their 
disposal any instruments to find out in advance which borrower will not perform its 
credit obligations.  In this way banks are confronted with adverse selection. If they 
increased interest rate on credit, the best borrowers ould refrain from borrowing. 
Banks could compensate a falling demand by extending credit supply to risky 
companies. By changing the structure of credit portfolio in favour of claims towards 
riskier borrowers, together with higher moral hazard threat, the probability of 
borrower's non-payment would increase. The increased probability of non-payment 
would diminish the expected profitability of bank portfolio. Therefore banks should 
not increase their interest rates despite the fact that credit demand surpasses credit 
supply at the higher interest rate. In this case, it is said that there is credit rationing. If 
banks satisfied the credit demand (balance), the cost of capital would turn out to be 
higher than one noticed in the perfect credit market. So, the credit rationing as well as 
the increased cost of capital in balance must have an influence on global demand and 
consequently on consumption, investments and stocks. 
 
In the disaster myopia approach bank managers know that there is a probability of 
loss realization. Nevertheless, they do not have at their disposal enough information in 
order to extrapolate that probability. In addition, they systematically tend to judge 
available information as something that supports superior thinking. During the 
growing phase of the cycle these subjective probabilities of loss can decrease. That 
dominant view stimulates banks to loosen the brakes seen in the activities of credit 
granting to a wider number of borrowers, estimated as very risky in the previous 
cycle, that is, they can more easily get a credit in the phase of expansion. 
Accordingly, the quality of credit portfolio can deteriorate and become riskier in the 
phase of cycle maturity. In the context of disaster myopia, the quality of banks assets 
deteriorates whether banks have consciously decided to accept a higher level of risk 
or not. The process continues until it comes to distrust regarding the solvency of a 
borrower. Then a credit crisis follows, which could be quite fierce. Banks start to 
behave in a different way and consequently support the formation of systematic risk. 
In fact, they reduce the credit supply drastically. They do that in an insufficiently 
selective way and consequently contribute to the growth of debtors difficulties. After 
dynamics of over-borrowing, the contraction of credits follows. Thus, the credit crisis 
threatens the real activity and intensifies the economic cycle. 
 
There are some other explanations of bank credit channel functioning, including 
shocks resulted from monetary policy changes. According to certain interpretations 
the influences of monetary policy do not only end on liability side (deposits), but 
adjust bank credit supply as well. These modifications of pro-cyclical nature often 
have qualification of Credit crunch (Bernanke and Lown, 1992, p.205-239). 
Numerous empiric researches, also based on asymmetric information between a 
borrower and a lender, apart from bank market include other credit markets as well 
(Fazzari et.al., 1988, p.141-195; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, p.309-340;  Bernanke et 
al., 1996, p. 1-15). They try to prove that external financing is more expensive than 
self-financing due to costs of agency, especially in the case of credit without 
collateral. That difference decreases with the growth of net wealth and increases 
proportionally with the growth of borrowing. Ill-fated shock which threatens the net 
wealth of borrowers increases the cost of external fi ncing and restricts their access 
to external financing. That could inspire them to diminish the costs of equipment, 
personnel and production. 
 
Finally, the facts from developed and emergent countries have clearly confirmed that 
markets of credits and assets functioned pro-cyclically and that they contributed to the 
frequency of bank crises (BIS, 1998, p.117-141; BIS, 2001, p.123-141). Credit cycles 
and assets prices are often simultaneous and they intens fy each other. Rises in prices 
of assets stimulate economic activity, and by inflating the value of guarantees they 
enable easier and cheaper access to financing for the private sector. The accelerated 
economic growth as well as the growth of credits incite a more intensive rise in price 
of assets. The interaction between credits and assets can be even stronger when the 
assets prices decrease and economic conditions become worse. The falling of 
guarantee value can cause losses to banks and can make them reduce credit supply 
substantially. The movement of real estate prices, especially real estate of enterprises, 
has played an important role in the most striking fi ancial cycles. The rise in prices of 
shares principally goes with the increase of credits, although it is noticed that this 
connection is weaker in relation to one with real estate prices. 
 
3. Credit and economic cycle: empirical testing 
 
Since the dependence of economic cycle towards credit cycle and risk is theoretically 
well established and clearly proved in numerous market economies (Bernanke, B.S., 
1983, p. 257-276; Bernanke, B.S. and Lown, C.S., 1992, p.205-239; Mishkin, F.S., 
1999, p.3-20; Avouyi-Dovi, S. et al., 2006, p.1-9; Cottarelli at all, 2005, p.83-104) , it 
is logical to presume that it is possible in Croatian economy as well. There are several 
reasons for this assumption. First, due to a lack of developed self-financing and 
financing through the issuing of securities, enterprises turn to credit sources. 
Secondly, the economy is liberalized to a great extent in the country and toward 
abroad as well. Thirdly, structural reforms of the legal system and privatization have 
not been completed yet. Furthermore, there are some problems in economic policy 
managing. Finally, there is a lot of space for development of risk management skills 
in banks and other business companies.  In such circumstances even the changes in 
the structure of bank credits could function in a pro-cyclic way. We presume that the 
credits to enterprises (generally bearing a greater risk) should have had more 
influence on economic activity and results than credits to households (generally 
bearing a smaller risk). This presumption will be examined statistically further in our 
work. 
 
3.1. Credits to Enterprises and Industrial Production 
 
In the observed period between January 1995 and July 2005 (monthly observations) 
we were analysing if there was any dependence of industrial production on credits 
given to enterprises and how strong it was. We took ne-year-shift supposing that at 
least medium-term credits could not directly have an influence on production. The 
series of statistical data regarding industrial production are given in basis Indexes 
(January 2000 = 100). By means of software package SPSS we got the results of a 
single regression assessed by Least Squares method. T e model as a whole and 
individual parameters turned out to be statistically significant. However, Durbin-
Watson (DW) statistics shows that residuals are not mutually interdependent, in other 
words, DW statistics close to zero (0,059) shows that ere is a problem of positive 
autocorrelation of residuals. In order to check which degree of correlation (first or 
other levels) of residuals it is, we tested the significance of autocorrelation (ACF) and 
partial autocorrelation coefficients (PACF) by means of Box-Ljung statistics. Since 
the ACF decreases and PACF disappears after the first time shift, we have concluded 
that residuals follow the AR(1) process, so we can describe them by model ARIMA 
(1,0,0). Therefore, the best thing is to include residuals into the initial model, so that 
two equations could be assessed simultaneously. In eco ometric analysis, the most 
used method for assessing the parameters of equation systems is Two Stage Least 
Squares, because the use of Least Squares method woul result in inconsistent 
assessment of parameters. After application of Two Stage Least Squares we have 
obtained the following system of equations1:     















The parameter next to the variable Xt-12 shows that with the growth of credits given to 
enterprises (with one-year-shift) of 1 million HRK, we can expect the monthly growth 
of industrial production by about 0.13% in relation t  January 2000 (base), supposing 
that other variables do not change. The model has been essentially improved after 
application of the Two Stage Least Squares method, n t only because of the measures 
of representative quality but because of DW statistics which shows that there is no 
problem of autocorrelation. 
 
 
3.2. Credits to Enterprises and GDP 
 
We have been studying what kind of influence the credits given to enterprises have on 
GDP (quarterly observations). As in the period between the first quarter of 1997 and 
the first quarter of 2005 GDP has explicit seasonal character, we have calculated 
quarterly seasonal indexes, i.e. factors, seasonal adjusted values of GDP by means of 
multiplicative model of decomposition (non-parametric method). When the seasonal 
influence is removed, the increasing trend of season l adjusted GDP values can easily 
be noticed. It can be explained by the fact that due to seasonal influence GDP was 
7.3% higher in the third quarter (July - September), while in the first quarter (January 
- March) it was 6.4% lower. Regardless of seasonal ch racter of GDP, we have not 
formed it by means of ARIMA model, because it turned out that in this case there is 
no problem of autocorrelation since DW statistics is 2.18. Therefore we used the 
classic regression model to establish the dependence of seasonal adjusted GDP values. 
The following results were obtained: 
Model Summaryb










Predictors: (Constant), Loans to enterprisesa. 
Dependent Variable: Seas adj ser for
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Coefficientsa
9798,903 2043,090 4,796 ,000












Dependent Variable: Seas adj ser for GROSDOMESTICPRODUCTmarketprices from
SEASON, MOD_2  MUL EQU 4
a. 
 
The model runs like this: tt XY ⋅+= 807.0903.798,9ˆ   The parameter next to the 
independent variable shows that we can expect the growth of GDP for 0.807 units if 
there is no seasonal influence and if the credits to enterprises increase by 1 million 
HRK quarterly, supposing that other variables do not change. 
 
 
3.3. Credits to Households and GDP 
 
As in the previous case, we used the classic2 regression model in order to establish the 
dependence of seasonal adjusted GDP towards total credits to households (in millions 
of HRK) since DW statistics (1.623) enters into thear a where it is not possible to 
make a decision. The observed period runs from the first quarter of 1997 to the first 
quarter of 2005. The following results have been obtained: 
Model Summaryb










Predictors: (Constant), Loans to householdsa. 
Dependent Variable: Seas adj ser for





28747,240 500,204 57,471 ,000












Dependent Variable: Seas adj ser for GROSDOMESTICPRODUCTmarketprices from
SEASON, MOD_2  MUL EQU 4
a. 
 
The model runs like this: tt XY ⋅+= 392.024.747,28ˆ   The parameter next to the 
independent variable shows that we can expect the growth of GDP by 0.392 units if 
there is no seasonal influence and if total credits to households quarterly increase by 1 




                                                
2  Linear univariate regression model. 
3.4. Credits to Households and Trade Turnover 
 
Since the resources for the purchase of flats (and houses) can be considered a long-
term investment and not a consumption, we have left it out of the analysis. Therefore, 
our intention was to establish the existence of a rel tion between trade turnover and 
credits given to households (without housing credits). As the trade turnover showed a 
distinctive seasonal character in the period between July 1999 and July 2005, we 
calculated monthly seasonal Indexes, in other words seasonal adjusted values of time 
series as well as trend-cycle values. After ACF and PACF testing it turned out that the 
most adequate model would be the ARIMA model (1,0,0)x(1,0,0)12, together with 
fulfilled conditions of stationarity and invertibility. In fact, it is a question of a non-
seasonal part of auto-regression process of the first rank AR(1) and a seasonal part of 
auto-regression process of the first rank AR(1)12 with the period of 12 months. After 

















The parameter by the variable X t-12 shows that on an average we can expect the 
increase of trade turnover of 83 million HRK if credits to households (without 
housing credits) increase by 1 billion HRK supposing that other variables do not 
change. All the parameters by given variables are statistically important as the empiric 
level of significance amounts to approximately 0.00%. DW statistics amounts to 2.44. 
 
 
3.5. Credits to Enterprises and Trade Turnover 
 
We used the same procedure as in the previous example to establish if there is any 
dependence of seasonal adjusted trade and credits given to enterprises (with one-year-
shift) in the period between January 1998 and July 2005 (monthly observations). We 
have found that the relation between the mentioned variables exists, but only at the 
significance of 14.7%. Thus, by the application of Two Stage Least Squares we have 
















With the increase of credits given to enterprises (with one-year-shift) of one billion 
HRK we can expect the increase in the trade turnover n an average of 110 million 
HRK, supposing that other variables do not change. Regardless of this explanation, 
the credits given to households have a bigger influe ce on the realized trade turnover 
than credits given to enterprises since the relation between the trade turnover and 
credits to enterprises is significant at only 14.7%. 
3.6. Key message  
 
If we compare the results of regression analysis we can conclude that there is greater 
influence on GDP by credits to enterprises than by credits to households although the 
coefficient of determination is lower by 7.5% (0.887 in comparison to 0.962). 
Namely, the parameters themselves show that the incr ase in units of credits to 
enterprises will increase the GDP (on an average by 0.807 units for each quarter) 
more than the same increase in units of credits to households (on an average by 0.392 
units for each quarter). Nevertheless, we have not been able to assess the parameters 
of multiple regression in which we observe the dependence of GDP simultaneously on 
both - credits to households and credits to enterprises because the problem of 
multicolinearity would appear. In other words, both independent variables would be 
in strong (according to intensity) and positive (according to direction) correlation 
(+0.969). Therefore, we will trust the parameters of partial regressions which are 
statistically very important, because the empiric level of significance almost amounts 
to 0.00%. It is logical that the influence on the trade turnover is bigger by credit to 
households than by credits to enterprises. This means that the quality of GDP growth 
is not encouraging since it is based on faster increase in consumption.   
 
 
4. Credit Risk, Boom and Bust 
 
Despite the fact that the previous econometric analysis confirmed the existence of 
positive relation between the dynamics of bank credits and economic growth, it has 
not shown anything about the possible influence of credit risk factors on that growth 
and vice versa. However, different facts suggest that the presence of this factor should 
not be disputable. It is the question of intensity of influence it has on financial and 
economic stability and growth. 
 
Figure 1.  
 





















Credits to households - left Credits to enterprices - left GDP - right
 
Source: CNB, Web page. Author's calculation. 
             CNB, Bulletin no. 132, 2007. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 1. clearly discloses the existence of two characteristic periods in which a credit 
boom and more or less important positive rates of ec nomic growth are recorded. The 
first period lasts till 1998 and the second one begins in the year 2000. Between the 
two there is a period of credit bust with simultaneous and drastic decrease of 
economic growth rate. As there were credit restrictions and economic recession at the 
time of bank crisis, one could get an impression that ere was a strong connection 
between neglects in the credit risk management and the fall of economic activity. 
However, the poor credit risk management could be only ne of the factors of the 
bank crisis. In addition, it is understood that economic activity is not determined only 
by changes in the credit policy of banks. Generally speaking, influences of different 
financial and real factors of static and dynamic nature interwove here. Of course, it 
can also be applied to the period since 2000. At firs sight the present condition of the 
banking system appears to be stable. It is partly the result of improved skills in the 
credit risk management. A credit expansion together with acceptable rates of 
economic growth can be seen as well. However, the situation in Croatian banking 
system is not so idyllic. There are some traces of its vulnerability. Some of them are 
permanently present, while some others have appeared recently. Therefore, it is 
necessary to remind of the circumstances when the first credit boom and bust 
happened. 
 
4.1. Credit Risk, Bank Crisis and Recession 
 
The manifestation of bank crisis in the market economies is always and basically the 
same. It is regularly preceded by credit expansion and increasing credit risk. 
According to some opinions the bank crisis usually fo lows if the credit expansion 
exceeds 5% of GDP (Demirgüc - Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, p.16-30; Cottarelli et 
al, 2005, p.83-104). Depending on the expanse and depth of the crisis, a stronger or a 
weaker fall of economic activity rate is recorded. Such was the scenario of the bank 
crisis and its consequences in Croatia. However, th credit boom and bank crisis in 
Croatia cannot be explained, or at least predominantly explained, by the consequence 
of influence of factors described in the item 2. The specific circumstances that 
preceded the first credit boom have to be taken into consideration. 
 
Principally, the factors of liberalization, the suspension of quantitative credit 
limitations and administrative interest rate management, or the removal of barriers for 
entrance of new banks into the market - all create good conditions for credit 
expansion and development of disaster myopia. The liberalization of economy started 
before and continued after Croatia became independent. In addition, after the 
Government's first intervention regarding the soluti n of the problem of blocked 
savings in foreign exchange in 1991, the inherited ba bank claims were substituted 
by government bonds. Some state-owned banks were privatized under strange 
circumstances. Nevertheless, after adopting stabilis tion and inflation reduction 
programme in 1993 it was found that balance and off-balance potential losses of large 
regional banks significantly surpassed regulated amounts of their own funds and 
reserves. Therefore some new interventions with government bonds followed. It was 
written about some quiet rehabilitations as well. But all of this gave poor results. One 
of the two biggest banks together with three big reional banks remained insolvent. 
They were main participants of a large demand in the interbank market, which 
induced the rise of interest rate above the level of 30%. This interest rate was 
substantially reduced (to approximately 9%) in the beginning of 1996 after takeover 
and additional capitalization of problematic big banks by the government. Till that 
period the banks’ lending activity had been narrowed due to some other reasons 
including the state of war. However, besides the rehabilitation of major banks, some 
other conditions for the start of credit boom had been created before that. Thus, the 
Banks and Savings Institutions Law from 1993 anticipated low capital requirements 
and relatively easier conditions for bank founding. Interest rate formation was 
liberalized as well. Those two reasons, together with some other, provoked a powerful 
entrance of new participants into the bank market. Between 1990 and 1997 the 
number of banks increased almost by 3 times (from 23 to 60). Banking business 
became the most attractive activity as big differences between lending interest rate 
and borrowing interest rate enabled high profits. 
 
Figure 2.  
 

















* Banks' lending interest rates on HRK credits indexed to foreign currency and on credits in Euros 
(total average) 
Banks' borrowing interest rates on HRK deposits indexe  to foreign currency and on foreign 
currency deposits (total average). 
Source: CNB, Bulletin, no. 132, 2007. 
 
Although the entrance of new banks had a certain influe ce on the size of the bank 
system and growth of credits, "the entrance itself was not the main factor of expansion 
of available credits" (Kraft and Jankov, 2005, p.110). On the rank-list of 15 biggest 
banks in 1997 there were 5 new banks that participaed with only 10.6% in the total 
bank assets. According to these two authors the liberalization of interest rate, which 
was an important presumption for the development of market society, had a very 
strong effect. That policy enabled the development of banking activities based on the 
principle of profit maximization, in distinction from the earlier dictated political 
priorities. Banks’ freedom in determining the amount of deposit rate made the growth 
of credit sources possible. The significant rise of deposit rate followed primarily 
because some new banks tried to achieve their fast growth in that way. Naturally, to 
some extent that affected the reallocation of deposits among banks themselves. 
However, interbank competition left its mark. Other banks followed fast-growing 
banks, so that it came to general rise of deposit rate and accordingly of lending 
interest rate. The interest rate spread on the Croatian bank market increased much 
more than one recorded in the majority of bank system  in West-European countries. 
In this way, in the circumstances of rigid monetary policy the growth of total banks 
sources occurred. The growth of total banks sources is caused by growing inflow of 
savings in the first place. The growth of savings is mainly explained as a result of 
more attractive deposit rewarding. That could attrac  especially the savings of 
Croatian returned emigrants. Deposits growth probably derived from tesauration of 
money, savings earlier directed abroad and an increasing number of rich individuals 
or big depositors. Anyway, the growth of total banks sources gave an opportunity for 
the expansion and overheating in the credit market. The epilogue was the bank crisis. 
 
The bank crisis started in the beginning of 1998 with the collapse of one fast-growing 
bank and reached its culmination by the end of the first quarter of the following year. 
During that period 16 banks, which participated with nearly 16.2 % in the total assets 
of the bank sector, were ruined. Due to that occurrence and to decreasing of credit 
activity of other banks a negative credit growth rate was recorded in 1999. The 
reasons for the bank crisis were directly connected to weaknesses in performing 
institutional reforms (legal system etc.) and to the privatization process which resulted 
in "tycoon empires". Ownership correlation of private banks to the corporate sector 
resulted in mutually connected lending. The lending throve due to the weaknesses of 
banking regulations and the central bank's supervision. Loans to insiders are thought 
to have been the biggest part of problematic bank credits (Kraft and Jankov, 2005, p. 
112). After all, weaknesses of the credit risk management in the phase of credit boom 
led to the bank crisis and credit bust. 
 
Finally, in spite of a statistically clearly proved relation between credit and economic 
cycles, it cannot provide a complete explanation. Some other factors, which have 
macroeconomic and microeconomic characteristics, influe ced changes in the GDP 
rate of growth. Some of them, which are supposed to be the main factors, were 
present in the second credit boom as well. 
 
4.2. Potential Dangers of Banking Distress  
 
A new credit boom, which started in 2000, occurred in altered circumstances. After 
banks had been conveyed upon foreign proprietorship, t ey intensified activities in 
qualitative and quantitative sense (Haas and Lelyveld, 2006, p.1927–1952). Croatian 
banks improved their risks management and solvency ratios seem to be satisfactory. 
They are efficient in the technical sense as well. However, one thing is functioning 
here - it is a credit channel from growing inflow of f reign short-term capital that 
gives preference to final consumption. According to some statements banks might 
become vulnerable because of an excessive expansion of t tal credits to the private 
sector, a decrease of differences between lending and borrowing interest rate, and 


















Figure 3  
 
Credits to private sector 
- in percentage according to GDP - 
 
Source: CNB, Web page. Author's calculation and graphics. 
 
The statement that a bank crisis develops in the circumstances of growth of credits to 
the private sector above 5% of GDP cannot be abandoned. As between 2000 and 2006 
those rates were 2.3%, 8.1%, 11.9%, 7.7%, 6.4%, 9.0% and 12.8% a credit bust 
should have already begun. If it has not happened yet, it does not mean that it will not 
happen. Our opinion is that the growth of credits to private corporate sector should 
not be problematic if a good credit risk management is applied (Cebenoyan and 
Strahan, 2004, p. 19–43).  What disturbs even more is an excessive growth of credits 
granted to the consumer sector in the conditions of po r domestic sources of saving. 
 
In the growing bank competition, the decrease of differences between lending and 
borrowing interest rate under a certain limit could threaten the effectiveness of their 
business. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that it has not happened yet. Finally, 
banks have really high profit, even at existing differences between these two rates.  
 
Table 1.  
 
Net margins 
- in percentage - 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Net interest 
margin 
4.71 4.09 4.21 3.58 3.28 3.33 2.97 2.87 
Net non-
interest margin 
1.76 2.14 1.94 0.96 1.40 1.16 1.30 1.21 
Net business 
margin 
6.47 6.23 6.15 4.54 4.68 4.49 4.27 4.08 
Source: CNB, Annual report, different years. Author's calculation. 
 
Although net business margin has a decreasing tendency, it is still considerably above 
the one realized in banks in Western Europe. Thus, in 2005 this margin came to 2.09 
in Italy, 2.24 in Austria, 2.07 in Germany, 1.80 in France etc. (OECD.Stat Extract, 
author's calculation). In addition, in banks in some of these and some other countries 
net non-interest income represents a bigger part thn net interest income. In the period 
between 1998 and 2005 the percentage share of non-interest income in the total 
income of Croatian banks chronologically was: 27.1; 34.3; 31.6; 21.2; 29.9; 25.7 and 
37.1 (CNB, Annual report, different years). That means that Croatian banks have big 
opportunities for developing off-balance activities, pecially in the area of financial 
market operations (issue of securities for the corporate sector etc.). Rationalization 
can be also found within administrative costs. 
 
It seems that banks might be the most vulnerable to a p ssible decrease of economic 
activity rate. The circumstances in which the existing rates of GDP growth occur are 




Crucial macroeconomic indicators 
 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 
GDP - year-on-year 
rate of growth (in %, 
constant prices) 
5,9 6,8 2,5 -0,9 2,9 4,4 5,6 5,3 4,3 4,3 4,8 
Average year-on-year 
inflation rate 
3,5 3,6 5,7 4,0 4,6 3,8 1,7 1,8 2,1 3,3 3,2 
Current account 
balance (as % of 
GDP) 
-4,8 -12,3 -6,8 -7,0 -2,4 -3,6 -8,5 -7,1 -5,1 -6,4 -7,8 
Outstanding external 
debt (as % of GDP) 
27,0 38,0 47,6 54,5 61,4 61,4 61,9 75,8 80,0 82,4 85,3 
Imports of goods and 
services (as % of 
GDP) 
48,0 56,8 49,1 49,3 52,3 54,6 56,4 57,9 56,5 55,9 57,3 
Consolidated central 
government deficit (as 
% of GDP)  
- - - -7,1 -7,5 -6,8 -4,9 -6,2 -4,8 -4,0 -3,0 
Source: CNB, Bulletin, no. 132, 2007. 
 
Is the current economic growth sustainable or not - that is the question, because it is 
based on the consumption which depends on export (Zbašnik, 2005, p. 201-218). 
Besides the expansion of bank credits to households, the consumption is also backed 
by overrated exchange rate. That can be clearly proved through growing deficit of the 
balance of payments, fast-growing external debt andbu get deficit. The relation 
between balance of payments deficit and GDP growth is more than obvious. The 
balance of payments deficit is mostly the result of c mmodity exchange deficit. 
Therefore, some national economists propose the depreciation (devaluation) of the 
national currency. On the other hand, more serious analyses give a range of arguments 
that are not in favour of that particular move. In general, a positive effect on the 
balance of payments, from the depreciation of exchange rate (increase of export and 
decrease of import), could be neutralized in different ways. Among other things, 
increase of inflation rate would follow, then decline of employment in non-export 
sectors and of national real income, increase in payment of the indexed internal debts 
and burden of external debt payment (Stručka, 2004, p.24). However, an efficient 
economic policy is not a simple task. The decrease of tax pressure and budget deficit 
is necessary but it cannot be done painlessly. Our co ntry's external debt almost 
exceeds the limit of endurance, so that some cuts have to be done especially in public 
investments out of these sources. The final consumption will have to adapt itself to 
domestic production opportunities. Although the CNB has the right policy in limiting 
banks' external debt, it is still not enough. Of course, it is necessary to create 
conditions for capacitating domestic production. It certainly cannot be done easily and 
quickly. Anyway, banks should act in that direction. Otherwise they themselves will 
become vulnerable.  Efficient economic allocation of s urces and fight against credit 





Credit markets are imperfect. There are asymmetric information, moral hazard, 
adverse selection, disaster myopia and some other phenomena that explain the pro-
cyclical nature of movements in credit markets, financial and economic instability. 
Between 1995 and 2006 there were two credit booms and between them one credit 
bust in the Croatian banking system. During the credit bust, which was a result of a 
bank crisis, the rates of economic growth decreased drastically partly showing 
negative values. As the bank crisis was the consequence of poor credit risk 
management and supervisor's neglect, there should be no doubt that there is a 
connection between credit risk and cycle on the one hand and economic cycles on the 
other. Everything shows that a new credit bust could follow and according to the IMF 
estimate even a financial crisis. Balance of payments deficit and commercial balance 
deficit, external debt and budget deficit have become intolerable. Existing GDP rates 
of growth, mostly based on the growth of consumption, cannot be sustained. 
Limitation of deficit and slowing down of economic a tivity could make the banks 
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KREDITNI RIZIK, KREDITNI I EKONOMSKI CIKLUSI U 
HRVATSKOM BANKARSTVU  
 
Sažetak 
Cilj ovog rada je istražiti vezu izmeñu kreditnog rizika i kreditnog ciklusa s jedne strane, te 
ekonomskog ciklusa s druge strane u hrvatskom bankarstvu i ekonomiji. Takoñer će se 
ustanoviti potencijalne prijetnje ispravnom upravljn u kreditnim rizikom u bankama i 
stabilnosti financijskog sustava koje proizlaze iz utjecaja različitih faktora. Ne teorijskoj 
razini oko tih pitanja nije postignuta suglasnost. Ipak, ovisnost ekonomskog ciklusa o 
kreditnom ciklusu i riziku je jasno potvrñena u mnogim empirijskim studijama. U Hrvatskoj 
takva istraživanja nisu provedena. Rezultati naše regresijske analize pokazali su, izmeñu 
ostalog, da poduzetnički krediti imaju jači utjecaj na BDP od kredita kućanstvima. Statistički 
smo uočili dvije kreditne ekspanzije meñu kojima je došlo do kreditnog kolapsa. Tijekom 
prvog kreditnog kolapsa, do kojeg je došlo radi bankarske krize, stope ekonomskog rasta su 
drastično pale. Bankarska kriza je bila posljedicom lošeg upravljanja kreditnim rizicima i 
nepažnje supervizora. Sve ukazuje na to da bi mogao uslijediti novi kreditni kolaps i nova 
financijska kriza. Nemoguće je održati postojeće stope rasta BDP-a koje se baziraju 
uglavnom na rastu potrošnje stimuliranom kreditima. Ograničenje deficita i usporavanje 
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